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Introduction
Large scale Internet worm infestations, as seen last year in the cases of Code Red, Code Red II, and Nimda, are a cause of great concern for the computer security community. Even more alarming is the fact that it has been shown that far worse, i.e. more virulent, worm designs are possible [19, 18] . Moreover, there have been some indications that worms, constituting large-scale network phenomena, may have some quite unexpected effects on the network infrastructure, specifically surges in BGP routing traffic [5] .
Given the possible gravity of massive numbers of compromised hosts [18] or destabilizing effects induced on the network infrastructure, we view it as important to have the necessary tools to be able to study this type of phenomenon. Through modeling we hope to gain insights about the threats imposed by certain scenarios, the relevant time scales, how effective various countermeasures could be, and to investigate possible causal links with other observed phenomena. However, due to their sheer scale, these phenomena pose interesting challenges for any effort to model them at any level of detail. In this paper we describe the approach we are taking in attempting to model a large-scale worm infestation and its possible effect on BGP routing traffic.
Contributions of this paper include pointing to the framework of epidemiological models, developed for the study of biological diseases, as a useful abstraction and specifically how behaviors of certain worms agree with assumptions made in simple epidemiological models. Selective abstraction through the use of epidemiological models is key in enabling us to scale our model up to a point approaching a realistic system size. We also describe how we are approaching collection of data and modeling of certain essential model elements, such as topology, population distributions, and scanning traffic. However, the validation of this model against real data is the subject of currently ongoing work and is not addressed here. That is, we focus on the modeling abstractions that allow us to scale up the model to a point where we can address the relevant questions, rather than the outcome of specific questions.
Studying and modeling of worm phenomena has started only recently, as a response to the attacks of last year, but appears to be attracting increasing attention. A prominent example in terms of employing models is a very recent paper by Staniford, Paxson, and Weaver [18] , where the authors discuss the large attacks of last year and the possibility for even more virulent worms. They also evaluate some of these possibilities through abstracted models and simulations. In later sections we will discuss some other related work in epidemiological modeling and other relevant areas, such as topology generation for simulations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the Code Red v2 worm event on July 19, 2001 . This is the event we focus on throughout the paper. We discuss challenges in attempting to model a network phenomenon of this magnitude in Section 3 and the modeling approach we are exploring in Section 4. Section 5 describes elements of the model and the data we are basing these on. We present some preliminary results related to model scalability in Section 6, and finally summarize and discuss future work in Section 7.
The Code Red v2 Worm on July 19, 2001
What Happened: An analysis of the spread of the Code Red v2 worm by Moore can be found at the CAIDA web site [14] . According to their data, more than 350,000 hosts were infected by the worm in a 14-hour period on July 19, 2001 . The worm propagated by exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Microsoft IIS web server, specifically a version turned on by default in Windows 2000.
1 Once infected, the host would start scanning for other susceptible hosts by sending port 80 probes to randomly selected addresses in the Internet. Some versions of the worm would attempt to deface web pages on the infected server concurrently with the scanning.
At midnight UTC between the 19th and the 20th (as indicated by the host's system clock) the worm was programmed to change its mode of attack from propagating through the Internet to launching a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against a U.S. White House web server. Consequently, at this point almost all scanning traffic ceased. However, on August 1, surviving worm instances again went back to propagation mode which allowed the worm to resurface in a second wave.
Correlation with BGP Messages:
In [5] , the authors found an unexpected correlation between two large Internet worm infestations and global surges in BGP routing message traffic. When studying BGP routing update messages collected from 12 different ASes with high time resolution, they found that in contrast to the typical "background noise" of updates, the events of the Code Red v2 worm on 19 July and the Nimda worm on 18-19 September exhibited some special features:
Substantial increases (nearly tenfold) in the baseline number of prefix advertisements that i) rose rapidly and ii) decayed slowly-over a period of hours to days.
In contrast to typical sporadic update bursts, which tend to be short-lasting and localized, the prefixes affected appear to lack a localized source and were spread more or less globally. It is hypothesized that the high volume and long lasting nature of the updates are caused by BGP sessions repeatedly closing and reopening, presumably due to some forms of router software failures, although it is not clear exactly what could cause these failures. A number of possibilities in the form of various router stress scenarios are offered, e.g.:
CPU load stress: Protocol or slow path processing of packets due to high traffic diversity (number of flows) or high BGP message load.
xcessive memory demand: Traffic diversity (flows), cache overflows (ARP storms) or many BGP routes. We are interested in testing these types of conjectures using large-scale and detailed simulation models.
Challenges in Modeling Large-Scale Worms
Global-scale worm infestations are difficult to simulate for several reasons. Naturally, many of the general problems facing Internet modeling discussed in [9] apply here. But worm phenomena also have some special characteristics:
Inherently large-scale phenomenon: A successful worm design (in the eyes of its designer) gives rise to an inherently large-scale phenomenon, and requires the model to be of appropriate scale to correctly model the propagation dynamics. Attempting to scale it down leads to numerous problems in rescaling parameters and interpreting the model output.
Long time scales:
Worms that have been observed typically propagated over time scales of hours to days with the infection intensity continuously changing. This means that the difference between smallest and largest time scales (the relevant issue for simulation) may increase by several orders of magnitude, compared to e.g. studying some small number of FTP transfers or WWW sessions. We use the SSFNet simulator, 2 which has been shown to successfully facilitate scaling up network model size through parallel or distributed execution [4] . Even so, parallel simulation cannot be expected to be a cure-all for modeling challenges. Judicious abstraction will always be a key factor for successful simulation. However, it gives us the means to combine appropriate abstractions with the raw power afforded by parallel and distributed simulation techniques, and this combination can help us approach the desired model scales.
Modeling Worm Influence on BGP
Working under the hypothesis that worm scanning traffic induces an increase in BGP routing message traffic implies modeling three crucial elements:
A model of how the worm propagates and infects hosts in the Internet.
A traffic model for the scans emitted by the worm.
A model of how the worm scans induce stress on (some) routers, and how that stress translates to routing message traffic. The first two could be derived from measured data, but in the case of the third element, there exists little beyond con-jectures. However, testing such conjectures is what we are interested in doing here.
Initial Approach
Given that we already had a detailed packet-level simulator at our disposal, the SSFNet simulator, a natural approach to modeling was to start from the given framework. In this case it meant developing a detailed, packet-level, traffic model of the CRv2 worm. A model of the traffic generated by worm scanning for susceptible hosts in the network would be the final module, since Hosts, Routers, a protocol stack including TCP/IP, and a detailed model of the BGP routing protocol were already included. The remaining parts would be to model the spread through a susceptible population, for which there was data available, and finally to model a plausible router stress phenomenon.
Before long, however, it became apparent that the level of detail involved in this modeling approach led to a number of problems:
Model memory requirements and execution time meant that only a few thousand hosts could be modeled. This had not so much to do with the memory required for the hosts and routers as with the intense scanning traffic, which is costly to model on a packetby-packet basis.
The small scale of the model meant that it would be difficult to compare the worm propagation dynamics with real data. We would need to adjust for the fact that we were simulating a much smaller IP space and a small subset of the population of susceptible hosts. Due to these issues, model development was very slow and problematic. At this point it seemed inevitable that some form of abstraction would become necessary to be able to make substantial progress. This implied looking for a way to model the "macroscopic" behavior of the system rather than modeling all aspects at a "microscopic" level.
Mixed Abstraction Level Modeling
Since we would prefer to maintain high fidelity in terms of the BGP routing behavior, what we needed was some form of selective abstraction. Selective abstraction is not a new concept, but what we would like to emphasize here is the type of abstraction chosen. A suitable abstraction framework presented itself in the form of epidemiological models borrowed from the domain of biological diseases. The use of epidemiological models has previously been suggested in modeling the spread of computer viruses [11] (in this study the spread of viruses through exchange of floppy disks was considered), but traditional models did not fit the empirical data well. The authors hypothesized that sparse interaction patterns based on social connections between people were not properly accounted for in simple epidemic models, and proposed an alternative model to account for this effect.
Although network worms are not, strictly speaking, a new phenomenon [15] , it is only recently that they have become more prevalent and attracted significant attention, particularly from the media. Thus, to the best of our knowledge it is only recently that any efforts have been made to apply epidemic models to network worm propagation. We note here that, at least for certain types of worms, the assumptions in simple epidemic models appear to match the mechanisms of propagation much better than what was found in case of viruses earlier. We will discuss this in more detail in the following sections.
Using a macroscopic model, such as typical epidemic models, greatly simplifies modeling the worm propagating in the network. This is partly because it reduces the complexity of the model, and partly because it is a better match for the limited available data on the events. However, in order to successfully be able to combine it with a detailed model of the network infrastructure it is necessary for the two models to be largely separable, i.e. the interactions between the models must be limited. If we can assume that the worm propagation will be mostly independent of the state of the network, it can be modeled separately and used to drive the network model. But, if there is a substantial amount of feedback-for instance such that traffic in the network slows down the spread of the worm-this is likely to lead to complications. We assume that the routing may affect the worm, since it changes the connectivity and thus may cut off parts of the population, but that the network traffic will not significantly affect the propagation of the worm. Figure 1 illustrates the two levels of abstraction and how they interact in the model.
The epidemic model describes the spread of the worm as it infects hosts in the Internet using either a discrete stochastic (time-stepped) model, or a deterministic model (using differential equations). The network model, on the other hand, has detailed models of routers and protocols. Each router in the network model runs a protocol stack, also shown in Figure 1 , including the TCP/IP stack and the BGP routing protocol. The link between the network model and the epidemic model is implemented through a pseudoprotocol called "Worm". Another pseudo-protocol called "Router stress" implements the model of scan traffic stress and failure triggering in the router.
The two model levels use different time advancement mechanisms: the network model is event-oriented, and the epidemic model is time-stepped. However, this does not present a problem since a single recurrent event timer can be used to advance the epidemic model.
Models and Underlying Data
The general epidemic model considers a fixed population of size AE, where each individual can be in one of three for removed. In epidemiological terms, removals can occur for various reasons, such as: recoveries where the victim becomes immune to the disease, isolation of the victim, or death. The normal state progression for an individual is S I R, normally termed an SIR model. But other possibilities exist, e.g. if victims who recover do not obtain immunity to the disease they will again become susceptible S I S, an SIS model. Consider the SIR model and let the number of individuals in state S at time Ø be ×´Øµ, likewise for I and R. We then have ×´Øµ · ´Øµ · Ö´Øµ AE Ø ¼. The evolution of the system can be modeled stochastically (typically discrete state, and in either continuous or discrete time) by considering the probability of individuals becoming infected by interacting with already infected victims, or the probability of infected victims becoming removed. For "sufficiently large" populations, it is common to approximate the stochastic model by a continuous state continuous time deterministic model, using e.g. a system of equations due to Kermack-McKendrick (1927) [6] . With a slight change in notation we write them as:
where the constant ¬ is the infection parameter, i.e. the pairwise rate of infection, and the constant is the removal parameter. Here we have two processes acting on the population of infectives, and it is commonly assumed that the effects of multiple processes are additive. These equations rest upon "the law of mass action". According to the law of mass action, in the context of population processes, "if the individuals in a population mix homogeneously, the rate of interaction between two different subsets of the population is proportional to the product of the numbers in each of the subsets concerned" [6] . Thus, it incorporates the principle of homogeneous mixing-meaning roughly that interaction is equally likely between all members of the population in a given (small) interval of time.
The deterministic model tries to capture the mean behavior in large populations. A stochastic model is necessary for smaller populations, and may be more appropriate depending on how the model is used. A discrete-time stochastic model can be constructed easily by considering the probability of infection and the probability of removal as replacements for the ¬ and parameters, respectively. The number of new infectees or removals in any given time-step will then have a binomial distribution. In our simulations we have included both stochastic and deterministic versions, but for simplicity of exposition, in the remainder of this paper we will refer mainly to the deterministic versions. It is straightforward to construct the corresponding stochastic models.
Global Worm Propagation
Staniford [17] recognized the possibility of using deterministic equations, similar to an SI model (i.e. disregarding removals from the SIR model), to describe cumulative number of infections over time for the CRv2 worm. Starting from a population of susceptible hosts-running the unpatched Microsoft IIS web server-these become infected as worms scan and send infectious web requests. An interesting observation to be made is that since CRv2 used a uniform distribution of scans throughout the 32-bit IP space [16] , the homogeneous mixing assumption appears to hold very well in this case. Infected hosts will interact with a given probability with all other hosts. This is in contrast to the case of viruses spread by diskette exchanges where the models had previously been attempted and were found not to fit well, presumably due to sparse and non-homogeneous interactions. Figure 2a shows a graph from CAIDA's CRv2 web page [14] where Moore used this type of equation to fit to the collected data with parameters ¬ ½ AE, AE ¿ ¼¼¼¼, and time duration of attack Ì ½ h. However, data on the CAIDA site also includes estimates of hosts that appear to have stopped scanning, i.e. possibly been patched, rebooted, shut down, or filtered out. It would therefore be interesting to try to take these into account when attempting to model the system, and an SIR model will allow us to do that.
A few things need to be noted though. First of all, the majority of deactivated worms occur right before or around midnight of the 20th, as a result of the worm switching to the DDoS phase. We will disregard those since we are interested in the dynamics up to the point of deactivation. Secondly, patched, shut down, and filtered out hosts should be considered removed, but hosts that are merely rebooted will be susceptible to reinfection. However, since the data is stated to include only hosts that were not observed again, we can assume that they were effectively removed. We model the deactivations by a rough linear fit, assuming that deactivations start (from zero) at 15:00 and reach 150000 hosts by 23:00. This gives us a deactivation rate of 18750 hosts/h, or about 300 hosts/min, which appears to agree with the deactivation rate plotted on the CAIDA web page. A linear deactivation rate does not agree with the standard SIR model (equations 1-3), since this model would imply that deactivations grow exponentially as the number of infectives grows exponentially. Consequently, we modify the model slightly to use a deactivation rate function ´Øµ, independent of ´Øµ:
Ö´Øµ Ø ´Øµ (6) where ´Øµ ¼ for Ø 15:00, and ´Øµ ½ ¼ hosts/h otherwise. In contrast to biological victims, infected hosts do not spontaneously recover. So, the explanation for a need to alter the model could lie in limited resources to deal with infections, or time for information to spread about the attack before action is taken. The numerical solution to this modified SIR model is plotted in Figure 2b , indicating that the number of simultaneously infected hosts peaks just below 300,000 and then declines.
Spatial Decomposition
In order to study the effects on the infrastructure, we need to decompose the system spatially to consider the flows of scanning traffic and how it might affect, for example, BGP routers. Since we are studying the system at the level of inter-domain routing, we decompose the system into autonomous systems (ASes) and consider scans emanating from, and entering ASes. For each AS we model only a single gateway router (BGP speaker) and consider the scan traffic passing through it, Figure 2c . Since the number of ASes is currently above 10,000, we tend to be resource-constrained before reaching that number, so we model a special AS and gateway to hold "the rest of the Internet", i.e. all the hosts in ASes that we cannot afford to model explicitly. We model the worm propagation through a stratified epidemic model, where the host population is stratified into ASes. The continuous time general epidemiological model for a stratified population [6] where ¬ is the global infection parameter and Ô ØÓØ Ð is the size of the total IP space (more on this in Section 5.5).
Stratifying the model means that we now need to consider the distribution of susceptibles among strata, the infection rates/probabilities between strata, and for the routing model, the AS-level topology of the network.
Distribution of IP Space and Susceptible Hosts
If we know the rate of probing by a worm (discussed in Section 5.5), the infection rates can be calculated from the distribution of IP space and susceptibles among strata. We use BGP routing data collected by the Route Views Project [13] at the University of Oregon to derive the IP space distribution. Caution is necessary, since policies and transient events may skew one's picture in this type of data, but for this particular purpose we do not think any distortions of this type will be significant.
We used a data set collected on 26 October at 16:48 (being unable to find one for 19 July), and for each announced IP prefix, we calculate its size and relate it to the AS where the announcement originated. We sum the non-overlapping prefixes for each origin AS to derive the IP space distribution. Figure 3a shows the IP space CDF using a logarithmic (base 2) scale on the x-axis. The plot also shows a lognormal distribution fitted to the data, with a mean of ÐÓ ¾ of the data of approximately 12.2 and a standard deviation of ÐÓ ¾ of the data of approximately 3.17. This is a very rough fit, so in our simulations we have included support for both the empirical distribution as well as the log-normal approximation.
Deriving the distribution of susceptible hosts is more difficult, and at the moment we lack data on the distribution of hosts infected by CRv2 for July 19. However, CAIDA has published data [1] on the Code Red worm wave that hit in August, presumably a mixture of a resurgence of CRv2 and Code Red II (CRII). CRII is a different worm but it uses the same vulnerability. So, as a first order approximation when considering the distribution of vulnerable hosts we used the data on infected hosts from August. Figure 3b shows a scatterplot, using log-log axes, of the number of infected hosts for an AS versus its announced IP space size. There appears to be a correlation between Figure 3c . The large spike at zero corresponds to a large number of single infections that get rounded down. In the model we assign an IP space size to the ASes, then use the empirical distribution of the fractions to sample the number of susceptibles in each AS (converting a zero fraction to a single susceptible).
Topology
It is infeasible to model the full Internet topology, so we aim to develop a smaller topology with the same relevant properties. For us, properties which affect routing are most important [20] . We attempt to preserve the total number of paths, which has known effects on BGP convergence [12] . Rather than generating a graph artificially, we chose to apply reduction techniques to the Internet topology. This increases our chances of retaining any other important properties which are not immediately evident. A router-level topology is not practical to obtain, but an approximation at the AS level can be easily obtained from public BGP table dumps of highly connected routers (we used Route Views [13] ). Though this technique can miss 20-50% of the links [3] , it is a reasonable starting point given that it is undergoing a size reduction anyhow.
Data from the time frame of the worms yielded a graph with 12921 ASes and 25297 links, to which we applied a heuristic reduction method combining link pruning and AS merging. We make the observation that merging neighboring ASes with no common peers preserves the total path count, further implying that any acyclic subgraph can be removed without affecting convergence. We further refined this method to merge according to the degrees of the two neighboring ASes, merging pairs with smaller degrees first. In this way the topology is reduced from the edge toward the core. Link pruning is performed in proportion to AS merging, so that although the number of paths is reduced, the average AS out-degree remains approximately constant, agreeing with empirical observations [10] . By varying the number of merging iterations, we can derive topologies of any desired size, and we verified that their out-degree distributions agreed with Faloutsos et al. [8] , who also derived topologies from BGP table dumps.
We also abstracted ASes by assuming that they have just one router each, which makes graph disconnectivity more likely. However, it is hypothesized that smaller edge routers are more likely to be affected by the worm [5] , and our hazard function accounts for this by making them far more likely to crash than core routers. Because of this, we don't expect to see larger ASes get disconnected. Furthermore, because edge routers are crashing, both routing and worm spread are not as affected as if core routers were crashing. This abstraction also reduces BGP message propagation delay through an AS, but we account for this with an adjustable message processing delay parameter.
Worm Scanning Traffic
eEye [7] reported "about half a million probes per day" from a single CR (v1) worm based on lab experiments. This would correspond to approximately 5.8 probes/second, but with a great deal of uncertainty due to the coarse estimate. CR (v1) code analysis [7] has shown that the CRv2 worm probes hosts by sending an HTTP GET request. far, the most common outcome of a random probe will be a TCP connection setup timeout, which in Windows 2000 is rather short at 21 seconds. This is because: i) responding hosts are sparse, and ii) Win TCP waits for a timeout even if it receives an ICMP reply in the meantime. Thus after an initial burst of 100 probes, all threads would tend to wait for 21 seconds, wake up send another probe, wait again, and so on. Hence, we conjecture that this leads to synchronized (among threads in one worm) probe bursts, with a mean probe rate of ½¼¼ ¾½ probes/s (which agrees fairly well with the mean rate reported by eEye [7] ). It should also be noted that certain parts of the IP space are reserved (e.g. class D network space) and will not get probed, i.e. taking zero time, so the probe time and the probe space distribution (uniformly over the whole IP space [0,¾ ¿¾ ] according to [16] ) should actually exclude these addresses. We are experimenting both with models using only the mean probe rate, and models that attempt to capture the burstiness of probes.
Router Stress
It is not currently known with certainty how to explain the strong correlation between worm propagation and BGP instability, though hypotheses have been put forth (see Section 2). Our model is based on a hybrid of the CPU load and memory stress hypotheses of Cowie et al. [5] , who showed a correlation between router CPU utilization and worm scan rate. Though we don't know the exact relationships, memory exhaustion has also been shown to cause router crashes [2] .
We model CPU utilization as a function of the amount of normal traffic at the router (modeled probabilistically), the routing workload, and the number of worm scans originating locally but with external destinations. Incoming scans originating in other ASes are few and are presumed here to have negligible effect. The number of cycles required to handle the resulting workload is determined, and the CPU utilization is calculated based on that value. Excess cycles can carry over into subsequent time steps. We calculate memory usage from the number of routes present in the routing and forwarding tables at the router. We use hazard functions for both CPU utilization and memory usage such that below certain thresholds, crashing cannot occur, and above these thresholds the probability of a crash increases up to some maximum crash probability. These hazard functions offer several tunable parameters that can be used to test different stress conjectures.
On Model Scalability
We have obtained preliminary results on model resource demands that give us an indication of feasible network topology sizes and that can be compared to our early attempt using an all-out packet-level simulation.
The packet-level model uses a large amount of memory to model hosts and scanning packets. For instance, we observed memory usage increase by about 8 MB as the number of susceptible hosts was increased from 329 to 686. This was a small model of 152 OSPF routers and only 51 BGP routers in a fairly simple topology. Even so, assuming linear growth (best case) with the number of hosts, it would require in excess of 6 GB to model 300,000 hosts-and that is excluding the memory necessary to scale up the number of BGP routers. Moreover, packet-by-packet simulation scan traffic could lead to prohibitively long execution times.
In the mixed abstraction level model, the limiting factor is the number of BGP routers that we can simulate. Keeping in mind the simplifying assumption of only one router per AS, Figure 4 shows memory usage as the number of ASes in the network topology grows. The memory usage of BGP depends on the number of peers of a router and the total number of routers, so it also depends on the connectivity in the network. Data for CRv2 and CRII in August (Section 5.3) indicated that some 3,000 out of the more than 10,000 ASes in total were infected at that time, so we are striving to reach the order of a few thousand ASes.
In light of the expected memory demands and sequential execution times on the order of 30 hours for the largest models attempted here, we continue to see as important the ability to exploit distributed memory and parallel simulation techniques to reduce execution time. But, in terms of feasibility the picture has changed substantially compared to our early attempts with the all-out packet-level model.
Summary and Outlook
We have described the use of epidemiological models to selectively abstract key elements in a model of the Code Red v2 worm attack. These "macroscopic" models allow us to scale up our model to sizes to a point where we see promise in getting worm propagation dynamics and router interaction dynamics right, so that we can address questions of causal links between worms and effects on the routing infrastructure. We also described approaches to collecting underlying data for our models and some tentative results on resource usage as the model scales up.
To date we have simulated systems of a few hundred ASes, under the simplifying assumption of a single BGP router per AS, and we are striving towards simulating a few thousand ASes using a combination of parallel execution techniques and judicious abstraction. Our current efforts focus on validating the model against collected data and starting to investigate conjectures of worm-induced stress on BGP routers. We are also considering epidemic models for other observed worms, such as Code Red II and Nimda, as well as hypothetical threat scenarios.
